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"Probing the Frontiers of an Emerging Multi-Polar World"

Editors Desk

Obama’s Afghanistan War Hinges on Russian Supply Lines

by Webster Brooks

The success of President Obama’s planned surge of 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan will likely depend on support from an unlikely ally; Russia. On January 20, the same day Barak Obama was sworn in as President, CENTCOM Commander General David Petreus concluded his Central Asian tour and announced from Pakistan that agreements to transit commercial goods and services to U.S. forces in Afghanistan will ”include several of the countries in the Central Asia states and also Russia.” How the ugly war of words between the U.S. and Russia over Moscow’s Georgian invasion five months ago was shelved to forge a critical alliance around Afghanistan reveals much about America’s diminished capacity to project power in Central Asia. It’s also an ominous sign that Pakistan’s growing insurgency is wrecking havoc on U.S. supply routes to Afghanistan and the extremists potential to induce crisis in Pakistan.

Three-fourths of NATO supplies are transited to Afghanistan through Pakistan’s Khyber Pass, located west of the NWFP capital of Peshawar. The Taliban has destroyed hundreds of NATO provision trucks, unleashed deadly attacks against NATO convoys and raided key supply depots. Emboldened by its success, the Taliban is now attempting to choke off the vital port city of Karachi, where the NATA logistics hub begins. The Pakistani military’s inability to drive the Taliban from the Northwest Territory combined with ISI support for the Taliban has made maintaining Pakistani supply routes too risky a proposition to sustain NATO growing operations in Afghanistan. The new Obama administration has continued its devastating Drone aerial attacks against Taliban strongholds on the Afghan-Pakistani border. But civilian deaths associated with the Drone attacks are fueling anger and anti-American sentiment on both sides of the border, while weakening the legitimacy of President Kharzai and President Zardari’s governments. For all these reasons opening a second supply front for U.S. and NATO operations emerged as “mission critical” to push forward President Obama’s Afghanistan surge campaign.

Pakistan’s deepening turmoil and U.S. reliance on a revanchist Russia to ensure its supply lines in Afghanistan are unsettling realities. But dragging the unstable nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan into the equation represents a dangerous expansion of the “Long War” in Central Asia. U.S. negotiations with these countries over transit routes, access to air bases and foreign aid packages started before the 2001 Afghanistan invasion. The regional maneuvering has ebbed and flowed with the intensifying U.S.- Russian rivalry over Central Asian oil exploration, pipeline rights and the volatile internal politics of each country. Given the contention between the U.S. and Russia in Central Asia’s renewed “Great Game” a valid question arises; why has Russia come to the aid of its nemesis, the United States?

Moscow has a strategic interest in preventing the Taliban from toppling the government in Kabul, either directly or by leading a coalition of forces. The Taliban’s return to power would virtually eliminate Russian influence inside Afghanistan, whereas today Moscow has significant ties with Northern Alliance forces, President Kharzai and pro-Iranian forces inside Afghanistan. Furthermore, America’s aggressive efforts in Central Asia have led to the establishment of U.S. military installations in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Moscow and China are deeply troubled by America’s expanded military profile in Central Asia. President Putin moved to facilitate the transit agreements, rather than risking the U.S. cutting deals with Central Asia regimes without Russian input. For his services to the United States, the Obama administration reciprocated by hitting the mute button regarding Putin’s shut down of natural gas flows to European countries in mid-winter; a manufactured crisis that allowed Russia to blame the Ukraine for the shortages while extorting higher gas transit prices from Kiev.

Beyond blocking U.S. encroachment in its security perimeter, Russia has a long-term security imperative of preventing the spread of radical Islam to its neighboring former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These countries on Russia’s southern border have large Muslim populations and indigenous radical Islamists organizations that threaten Moscow’s national security and hinder its efforts to keep the former Soviet republics within its sphere of influence. Inside Russia, the transformation of Chechnya’s nationalist movement into a jihadist juggernaut supported by its majority Muslim population led to a bloody 12-year succession struggle bordering on ethnic cleansing. There are 20 million self-identified Muslims in Russia, a number that has risen by 40% in the last 15 years. Russian sensitivity to its potential Islamic threat is real, and the destabilization of any of its Central Asian neighbors could be a lightning rod that ignites the fuse.

Obama’s new Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke will undoubtedly tout the benefits of U.S. anti-narcotics initiatives in Afghanistan to curtail the flow of heroin that is devastating Central Asia and Russia. Construction projects, infrastructure development, U.S. dollars and other accoutrements showered on the Central Asian republics will ease the regional economic crisis and revive the failed “Silk Road” strategy of applying American soft power in Central Asia. Of particular concern to Obama’s foreign policy team will be buttressing Tajikistan; the poorest Central Asian country, rife with weapons and narcotics smuggling, and tense ethnic divisions with its Uzbek neighbors that could collapse the nation into a failed state. Such a development would increase the difficulties of stabilizing Afghanistan and heighten US-Russian regional geo-political rivalry.

For the United States and Russia, expanding the War in Afghanistan to the Central Asian steppes, even with a benign act of securing transit routes is a risk they are willing to take to prevent the Taliban from taking power in Kabul. What becomes problematic is the possibility that Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar is not to contending for state power, but destabilizing the Kharzai government to the point where the Taliban can maintain control of a limited number of provinces while expanding its sphere of influence. Indeed, what seems more likely is that the Afghan Taliban is working in concert with the newly emerging Pakistan Taliban and al Queda in an effort to establish a rump confederation that consolidates their joint control of Southeastern Afghanistan, Pakistan ’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Provinces. In short, these forces are carving out a failed state of Pushtanistan in the ungoverned territories along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

On January 22, President Obama called Pakistan and Afghanistan “the central front of terrorism,” and spoke of the necessity of eliminating this global threat starting in Afghanistan. By securing Russia’s aid to open new supply lines for NATO and U.S. forces, he just might be falling deeper into al Queda’s deadly trap of extending U.S. forces across Afghanistan, expanding unpopular bombing missions, increasing cross border excursions into Pakistan’s Northwest Territories and exposing more American forces to attack on the Central Asian steppes. The battlefield in Central Asia is being stretched. No one is sure where it will end.

Obama Can Win in Afghanistan

With a Soft Partition and the

"Reverse McChrystal Strategy"

BFPR ANALYSIS

October 11, 2009

by Webster Brooks

The critical moment for President Obama to announce a decision on America’s strategy to win the war in Afghanistan is fast approaching. In the ongoing series of White House war councils, debate continues on General Stanley McChrystal’s August report that stated “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12-18 months)….risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible.” Over the next 18 months President Obama faces four critical questions: 1) Developing a response to stem the Taliban’s growing influence and putting the insurgency on the defensive, 2) Redeploying U.S./NATO/ANA forces to tilt the battlefield in their favor, 3) Brokering an agreement to form a power-sharing post-election government and 4) Reorganizing state building and reconstruction efforts to create the foundation needed to sustain Afghanistan. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy (RMS) represents the best and most realistic strategy to achieve these objectives in the next 18 months and prepare for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops over the long run (3-4 years).

The centerpiece of the Reverse McChrystal Strategy calls for redeploying U.S./NATO military and economic power to consolidate Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan into a “maximum safety zone.” Securing these three regions now where 65% of all Afghans live, and linking them to vital reconstruction efforts is the most effective way to diminish the Taliban’s momentum and solidify critical mass around the central government. Supported by 20,000 additional American troops, U.S./NATO operations would shift from conducting “clear, hold and build missions” inside the Taliban dominated Pashtun belt to providing maximum security to Kabul and the 23 identified “median and low-risk” provinces where the Taliban’s presence is minimal but spreading (see map). Recent Taliban advances outside the Pashtun belt suggest that U.S. forces engaging their adversaries from Kunduz in Northeastern Afghanistan to the southern province of Helmand are overstretched and under resourced. General McChrystal’s request for 40,000 to 80,000 troops to pursue the elusive Taliban plays directly into the Taliban’s hit and run strategy. Meanwhile, the Taliban continues to maneuver and expand the battlefield, launching surprise offensives in new areas. What is most important now for President Obama and the faltering Afghan government is reversing the Taliban’s momentum by consolidating order, safety and stability over a significant section of Afghanistan. Demonstrating real progress and a model of a viable state is of the utmost urgency. Securing Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan would not only demonstrate tangible success, it would decisively impact the balance of power on the ground.

The Reverse McCrystal Strategy also calls on U.S./NATO forces to scale back forward operations for oneh year in the Pashtun belt where the Taliban enjoys real support, superior battlefield knowledge and strategic depth with supporting rear-guard bases in Pakistan. The tactical pullback in the Pashtun belt would be done in conjunction with the mass redeployment to Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan. A “demilitarized zone” and safe transit corridors to-and-from the Pushtun-belt provinces would be established for commercial purposes and safe passage. In addition, US/NATO forces would continue the “limited use” of Drone attacks and Special Forces operations on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border to interdict arms shipments and infiltrating al Queda elements. Redoubled efforts in cooperation with Pakistan’s government to destroy critical Taliban support networks in Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas is of critical importance. Concurrent with these changes, Afghanistan’s government would open discussions with Pashtun tribal leaders, parliamentary officials and “willing” Taliban elements over a potential framework for regional autonomy and other national reforms.

While the RMS embraces General McChrystal’s call for a shift from defeating the Taliban by force of arms to creating safe havens, it reverses the battlefield deployment and political focus by winning the hearts and minds of two-thirds of Afghanistan’s provinces first. It optimizes opportunities to contain and undermine the Taliban by negating the most compelling factor powering its surge; the prevailing state of chaos across Afghanistan led by an incompetent and corrupt Karzai government and criminal warlords.

By increasing troop levels, resetting US/NATO/ forces and tactically pulling back in the Pashtun Belt, President Obama will gain valuable breathing room to bring America’s allies on side, settle the post-election political governmental crisis and train additional Afghan National Army troops. Whether there is a run-off election or not between Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, it is critical that both men participate in a new coalition government. The effort to stabilize Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan will require significant compromise between Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras and Turkmen who were the core of the Northern Alliance that helped topple the Taliban in 2001. Many of these forces also supported Abdullah Abdullah in the first round of the presidential elections. For better or worse, as a Pashtun, Hamid Karzai can still be a valuable asset in talks with provincial leaders on instituting various forms of autonomy in Pashtun communities. While the character of the Taliban’s insurgency is Islamic-based, the Taliban has remained a predominately ethnic-Pashtun movement. Increased autonomy may create new vehicles and greater choice to incorporate Pashtun cultural, religious and traditional practices into provincial governance structures, thereby dispelling notions that only the Taliban can fulfill these aspirations. The essential point of autonomy in the Pashtun belt is that increased empowerment at the provincial level will afford Pashtun more choices and resources to exert independence from the Taliban.

Critics of the Reverse McChrystal Strategy will undoubtedly claim that any pullback-temporary or otherwise- from taking the fight to the Taliban is tantamount to capitulation or surrender. But there is no purely military solution to end the war in Afghanistan. The consensus view is that sufficient damage must be inflicted on extremists Taliban elements to create conditions that will compel moderate and wavering Taliban elements to align themselves with the central government. By creating a safe and viable Afghanistan state in Northern, Central and Western Afghanistan supported by a majority of the Afghan people, the Taliban’s rationale that they are the only force that can restore order will be severely undermined. Containing the Taliban’s advances by a soft partition of the Pashtun belt will halt their expansion and reverse their momentum. Increased efforts with Pakistan to neutralize their rear-guard support bases will bottle the Taliban up in a confined space. Offers of greater autonomy and redefining their relationship to the Afghan government will stimulate more debate among the Pashtun people about where their future interests lie and further undercut support for the Taliban. The Reverse McCrystal Strategy in its initial phase will significantly weaken the Taliban militarily and drain its political support among the Pashtun people. Moreover, RMS can accomplish all these achievements with the lowest possible U.S./NATO casualty rates. With public opinion weakening in America and Europe for the war, tangible success in stabilizing 65% of Afghanistan today combined with minimum casualties is the formula to sustain support for the cause in Afghanistan. If and when US/NATO forces have to move decisively to fully re-engage militarily in the Pashtun belt they would confront a far less formidable adversary.

Prosecuting unpopular wars against insurgencies that cannot be won militarily is sometimes the burden of policing empire. There are no easy options for President Obama in Afghanistan. What is required now is an imaginative approach that breaks with conventional thinking. The Reverse McChrystal Strategy offers both. ******

Obama’s Unfolding Strategy for “Victory” in Afghanistan

Webster Brooks, Editor

Brooks Foriegn Policy Review

August 4, 2009

ANALYSIS

With July marking the deadliest month of combat for U.S. and NATO forces since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, America’s fortitude and patience with an intensifying military conflict will be severely tested in 2009. So too will President Obama’s leadership as a wartime president. England and Canada’s flagging support for the war, rising casualty rates and abducted American soldiers pleading for their lives on cable news channels are already generating concern at the White House and the Pentagon. Because wars can be lost by the lack of domestic support just as easily as suffering military defeats on foreign battlefields, President Obama must continue to forcefully articulate what vital American interests are at stake in Afghanistan. He should answer his critics who question his rationale for escalating a war most experts agree cannot be won militarily against an enemy that poses no existential threat to America. Afghanistan is now Barak Obama’s war. His credibility as Commander-in-Chief and his presidency may well depend on it.

President Obama came to office with a clear and well conceived strategy to prosecute the “Forgotten War” in Afghanistan; one he has relentlessly pursued in his first six months in office. Having inherited George Bush’s war, he immediately redefined the goal in Afghanistan as defeating al Queda and its extremists Taliban allies, and denying them a sanctuary to launch attacks against America. Obama’s critical first step called for a larger American military footprint on the ground. Not surprisingly, his attempts to persuade our NATO allies to make a similar commitment were not very successful. Although some of his detractors questioned his decision to expand America’s commitment in Afghanistan out of fear that the U.S. would get bogged down in a military quagmire, President Obama had no choice. When he assumed office in January, the Taliban had advanced to the outskirts of Kabul, and were gaining control of more provinces within the country. Not to act quickly and decisively to increase America’s presence on the ground risked the downfall of President Hamid Kharzai’s weak and unpopular government. The possibility of Afghanistan collapsing into a failed state would have dramatically destabilized the region and vastly complicated an already dangerous situation in neighboring Pakistan and Iran. Since the arrival of additional troops in Afghanistan and Obama’s installation of General Stanley McChrystal to lead the war effort, the Taliban’s offensive has been blunted and President Kharzai’s government has been shored up. The troop surge has also been critical to restoring order across the country in the lead up to the September presidential elections.

In July, Obama’s troop surge unfolded as the locus of his long-term strategy of unleashing a military offensive to break the back of extremist Taliban forces entrenched in Eastern Afghanistan. President Obama’s goal is not to totally destroy extremist Taliban elements, but to significantly reduce their military capability and influence; thereby creating new conditions to draw “moderate” Taliban elements into Kharzai’s ruling coalition government. July’s ground offensive targeted the Taliban’s most significant stronghold in southeastern Afghanistan’s Helmund Province. Helmund Province is not only one of the Taliban’s military and cultural centers of gravity, but the most profitable poppy growing region in the nation that finances much of the Taliban’s operations. The Taliban cannot be defeated until its economic lifeline to narcotics trafficking is degraded and U.S./Afghan National Army forces exert more control over the areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to stem the flow of jihadists, arms and drugs to-and-from Pakistan.

The costs of taking the fight to the Taliban thus far have been heavy. The spike in U.S. and NATO casualties will undoubtedly continue throughout 2009 as the missions to subdue the Taliban in Eastern Afghanistan continue. In July, NATO and American forces suffered 75 fatalities; 42 U.S. troops were killed and six more died the first two days in August. Despite the uptick in combat deaths, the U.S. and NATO must continue to press forward on the battlefield. Their failure to do so would send a negative message to the Afghan people who already question America’s commitment and resolve to the future wellbeing of Afghanistan.

Similar to Iraq, the U.S. military is attempting to drive the Taliban out of its areas of refuge and support, and then remain in the “liberated” areas to secure the safety of local inhabitants. This close combat and exposure to enemy fire associated with the “capture, hold and build” strategy is more challenging in Afghanistan which is not only larger but more ethnically and tribally diverse than Iraq. The Afghan Taliban forces are extremely capable and well trained, particularly in using suicide and roadside bombs to kill American soldiers. Thus higher casualty rates must be expected.

By pressing its ground and air offensive early and hard against Taliban strongholds in Helmund Province, President Obama is hoping to score a decisive victory that will create the momentum to confront the Taliban in Afghanistan’s other eastern provinces like Kandahar, while at the same time demoralizing wavering Taliban elements. Key to the success of the Obama’s strategy of winning moderate and wavering Taliban elements over to the Kharzai government is convincing them that the Taliban hardliners cannot win the war or offer its citizens a better life.

As an integral part of this strategy the U.S. is moving to implement a similar tactic used with success in Iraq in the Anbar Awakening; putting Taliban insurgents on its payroll to stop fighting the Kharzai government. In Iraq the U.S. coughed up $30 million a month to pay 100,000 Sunni insurgents $300 each. In Afghanistan it has been estimated that its 250,000 insurgents could be paid $120 a month, or the national average of the salary of the lowest ranking members of the Afghan army. In the weeks ahead the Obama administration can be expected to roll out this program after the presidential elections.

A second strategy the Obama administration is reviewing to bring more moderate Taliban elements into Kharzai’s coalition government is “flipping” various Taliban leaders and groups. In Afghanistan’s past twenty years of internal warfare, various warlords, tribal and clan leaders have often “switched sides” in the middle of a conflict based on who they think will win. Warlords and tribal leaders joining the same forces they once fought against has been a constant and peculiar feature of Afghanistan devastating patchwork of civil wars. In short, many Taliban leaders have placed insuring the survival of their own tribes and klans above their loyalty to national Taliban leaders like Mullah Omar or major figures from other provinces. The Obama administration has made it clear to Hamid Kharzai, that if he wins the presidential election, he will have to reach out to various Taliban forces that have opposed him and even fought against him in the past. He will also have to end the rampant corruption that has marked his presidency. Kharzai has already begun making his peace with some of these Taliban leaders by offering them offices in his government in exchange for their support for his candidacy. While “flipping” certain Taliban leaders is an intricate and complex process intrinsic to Afghan culture, the prospects of its success will be dramatically improved the more U.S. and NATO forces are able to rock the Taliban extremist back on the heels militarily.

Beyond the military component of the Afghanistan War, financial support, NGO involvement, reconstruction teams, education, infrastructure and economic development assistance are needed to stand up a viable functioning state. If the U.S. is going to eradicate poppy fields and production that constitutes 60 percent of Afghanistan’s economy they must also have replacement crops and programs available to poor Afghan farmers to maintain their support. Coordinating and bringing these resources to bear on Afghanistan is far beyond the means of the United States alone. It will require the cooperation and assistance of NATO countries and others like India, Iran and Russia that already have substantial investments and national security interests in a stable Afghanistan. But these massive investments and improvements in the daily lives of the Afghan people can only become tangible in an environment where there is a reasonable hope of long-term security and stability in government. Right now the Afghan people have neither.

President Obama is well aware of the dangers of getting bogged down in a long-drawn out war in Afghanistan; one the United States cannot afford militarily or financially. Afghanistan storied history as being the graveyard of empires from Genghis Khan to the Soviet Union’s disastrous occupation has informed his military strategy. President Obama’s troop surge and military offensive to “capture, hold and build” territory while changing facts on the ground in the short run is the only realistic strategy that can create the conditions for a negotiated settlement with moderate and wavering Taliban forces. It is a realistic approach for getting American troops out of Afghanistan sooner rather than later. Whether the American people will demonstrate the resolve to support America’s difficult and painful mission in Afghanistan remains to be seen. As for the Obama Administration, there can be no turning back now. ******

Why Obama Needs Abdullah Abdullah to Win Afghanistan's Presidential Election

by Webster Brooks

August 21, 2009

Washington, D.C.

Should Abdullah Abdullah pull off a come-from-behind victory to defeat incumbent Hamid Kharzai in Afghanistan’s presidential election, Barak Obama’s path to end the eight-year war will dramatically improve. With one week left until the August 20 elections, Kharzai’s once unchallenged candidacy has plummeted to 36 percent in the polls; well below the 50 percent needed to avoid a run-off against the second place finisher. Out of nowhere, Afghanistan's former Foreign Minister Abdullah’s campaign against the pervasive corruption and criminal malfeasance of the Kharzai regime has surged; drawing huge crowds and attracting endorsements from unlikely allies. In the last month his poll numbers have jumped from low single digits to 21 percent. With Kharzai and Abdullah heading toward an almost certain runoff, the Obama administration’s hopes are rising that Abdulla can ride the wave of momentum to the presidential palace in Kabul. Afghanistan’s future as a viable nation-state could well turn on the election. So too could Barak Obama’s presidency.

Increasingly, Barak Obama’s war doctrine is coming under fire in the U.S., and his NATO allies in Canada and Britain are wavering under mounting domestic anti-war sentiment. Since Obama’s controversial surge of 21,000 additional troops, renewed fighting against the Taliban in Helmand Province in July and August has led to the highest rate of American fatalities since the 2001 invasion. The heaviest fighting and the potential political backlash of an Ameican public growing weary from the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq still lies ahead. Worse still, Obama’s commanders in Afghanistan are asking for a minimum of 10,000 more troops for the summer offensive to “hold and build” the territory they are paying such a high price to recapture. Those numbers could climb to 30,000 troops or more with the logistical support needed to wage a sustained coordinated offensive against the Taliban. There are also plans to boost America’s civilian contingent from 560 to 1,340 personnel over the next year to literally run whole departments of Afghanistan’s beleaguered government. The price tag for the Afghanistan war and Obama’s version of “nation building lite” could run as high as $100 billion in 2010 according to Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institute.

Moving aggressively, the Obama administration is leaking its plans to prepare public opinion for another troop escalation. They must stage manage the high profile media coverage that will occur when Defense Department officials appear before Congress to request additional funding and troop increase authorizations. Congress will comply with President Obama’s request, but not before excoriating Kharzai’s government for its corruption, ineptitude and incompetence over the last seven years. As one senior U.S. senator said, “We don’t want to ‘Rumsfeld’ Afghanistan. Before approving the appropriations Congress will also nail the Department of Defense and administration officials to the wall; demanding metrics and milestones to measure success, including the performance of Afghanistan’s government.

With so much at stake, Obama’s aides pushed back Afghanistan's Commanding U.S. General Stanley McChrystal’s scheduled testimony before Congress until Afghanistan’s August 20 elections are over. If Abdullah Abdullah forces a run-off election in early October, the administration will not be pigeonholed into defending Kharzai’s deplorable record of squandering a substantial amount of treasure and American largesse. Quite the opposite, a runoff election will provide the White House a window of opportunity to tout the strength of Afghanistan’s emerging democracy and justify its massive expenditures.

Like Obama in the 2008 presidential campaign, Abdullah Abdullah is Afghanistan’s “change candidate.” As the champion of reform Abdullah has argued for diminishing the power of the presidency and delegating more power to provincial districts and governors. Abdullah is also advocating direct elections of district governors rather than continuing the current system of presidential appointments that have been the source code of Kharzai’s corruption. Ironically, the Obama’ administration has begun setting up structures to channel funds directly to the provinces, NGO’s and agencies outside the reach of Kharzai’s executive authority. Short on details, but sweeping in his rhetorical flourishes about overturning the old order, Abdullah is striking the right chord with millions of Afghan’s who bristle at Kharzai’s failure to improve their life chances.

As the son of a Pashtun father and a Tajik mother, Afghanistan’s former Foreign Minister has cross ethnic appeal. He was a close confident of the legendary Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Masud, who spearheaded a coalition of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara militias to overthrow the Taliban regime during the 2001 invasion. Abdullah has stitched together a cross section of the old Northern Alliance coalition along with support from the Herat’s powerful warlord Ismeal Khan. Kharzai countered by bringing on two vice-presidential running mates; Tajik strongman Mohammad Qasim Fahim and Hazari powerbroker Karim Khalili. Karzai has also been endorsed by the mercenary Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum. The three warlords aligned with Kharzai exert enormous influence over local governments, police, Afghan army units and electoral officials.

Moving into the final week of the campaign the election is heating up. The Taliban has vowed to disrupt the elections. There is no reason to think they won’t carry through on their promise. An estimated thirty percent of the polls nationally may be closed due to the lack of security. Millions more will not vote at open polling stations fearing Taliban retribution. Reports are surfacing that Kharzai’s government, with the help of his brother (also reputed to be a narcotics smuggler) has put over 3 million duplicate voter registration cards in circulation, particularly in Kandahar province, a Pashtun stronghold of Kharzai. Registration fraud and ballot stuffing by Kharzai supporters in majority Pashtun areas is likely as Kharzai seeks to make up votes not cast due to intensified fighting between the Taliban and US/NATO forces in Kandahar and Helmand provinces. The level of fraud is such that voter registrations now exceed the number of registered voters. Registrations for women are also far greater than anyone could have reasonably imagined.

While Abdullah claims he is popular enough to overcome any poll rigging, his spokesmen have warned that he will reject a result that has Karzai winning in the first round—evoking visions of Mahmoujd Ahmadinejad’s tainted first round victory in Iran’s presidential elections and the mass protest that followed. With the political battle lines hardening in Afghanistan, a first round victory by Kharzai and claims of fraud will not only polarize Afghanistan but could lead to violent confrontations.

If Abdullah forces a second round run-off election with Kharzai, he will reach out to as many of the other 38 other candidates to consolidate their constituencies into an anti-Kharzai vote. Two key players that could be critical to an Addullah second round victory are former Planning Minister Ramazan Bashardost and former Finance Minister Dr Ashraf Ghani. In the latest polling, the anti-corruption crusader Bashardost had seven percent of the vote and Ghani, a Pashtun polled at three per cent.

For Barak Obama, it is critical that a credible election is held on August 20. A chaotic election, mired by fraud and violence will erode confidence and support for the government in Kabul among Americans, our NATO allies and the Afghan people. It will also be a propaganda victory for the Taliban. The resurgent Taliban’s strength is derived as much from the Kharzai government’s monumental failure as it is from their own fighting capacity, ideological appeal and cultural affinity to the Afghan people. In eighty percent of Afghanistan the federal government has no presence in the form of courts, police, tax collection and social services. The Taliban and Afghanistan’s checkered gallery of warlords provide these essential functions, including narcotics trafficking and collecting taxes on goods transported across Afghanistan’s borders.

The election of Abdullah Abdullah, and ending Kharzai’s corrupt regime could halt the slide of Afghanistan toward a fractured dysfunctional state. While Afghanistan will require massive infusions of foreign aid for years to come, and the war against the Taliban will get worse before it gets better, Afghanistan can begin to build a new sense of its national identity and destiny. Vibrant leadership with integrity is essential to that enterprise. The Afghan people deserve a functional government to guide their ship of state. Combined with President Obama’s aggressive military offensive to rock Taliban extremist back on their heels and create conditions for a settlement with “moderate” Taliban elements, Abdullah’s election could be the seminal moment Afghanistan has been waiting for. On August 20, the Afghan people can "live in the moment" by take the first step by sending Abdullah Abdullah into an October run-off election.***********

October 27, 2009

President Obama’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2011 marks a decisive setback for America’s strategic goal of securing a platform to project power across Central Asia. The future of Afghanistan—the region’s coveted gateway sitting between Russia, China, India and the Persian Gulf--is now up for grabs. As President Obama’s pullout was an admission that the Taliban could not be defeated militarily, the outbreak of a future civil war must be considered as more probable than possible once U.S/NATO forces withdraw from Afghanistan. In addition to the threat of renewed civil war, the breakup of Afghanistan and possibly the partitioning of the country may be unavoidable if Iran, Russia, India, Tajikistan and Pakistan intervene to back various proxy forces to protect their own vital national security interests.

In this light President Obama’s escalation of U.S. troop levels by 30,000 additional forces should be viewed as a transitional holding strategy. The administration’s strategy has now shifted to significantly degrading Taliban forces over the next eighteen months while shrinking the battlefield of Taliban controlled areas to the ethnic Pashtun belt. In the meantime President Obama will be hard pressed to create a parallel government to Hamid Karzai’s regime and cobble together a military coalition to confront the Taliban as US/NATO forces prepare to surrender the battlefield. The Obama administration is desperately searching for a formula to salvage a pro-Western government while maneuvering to avoid a strategic disaster in which Afghanistan collapses into a failed state or is eventually overrun by the Taliban.

President Obama’s decision to increase short-term troop levels while simultaneously announcing a 2011 withdrawal date bore all the markings of a compromise between the U.S. military’s aggressive campaign for full scale engagement with the Taliban and the growing American anti-war movement clamoring for a pullout. In truth, Obama’s hawk and dove approach (escalate and withdraw) authentically reflected his assessment of the Afghan dilemma after convening ten White House war councils. In Obama’s view, victory over the Taliban could only be achieved at the expense of an extended war that could potentially exhaust the U.S. military. The associated war debt and nation-building outlays piled on top of an already financially leveraged Treasury Department could trigger another downturn in America’s economic recession. A long-term military commitment and mounting U.S. troop casualties could unleash an even more massive revolt of the American people to end the war. In short, Obama concluded the price of victory was simply too high. Given the facts on the ground, President Obama had no choice but risk a “middle strategy” by temporarily surging U.S. forces to militarily knock the Taliban back on its heels while attempting to stand up a re-structured Afghan government and fashion a new joint military/militia force.

In the wake of President Obama’s speech the administration now finds itself in a race against time. Between December and April 2010 the U.S. military will be moving at breakneck speed to deploy as many forces as possible in Southeastern Afghanistan in anticipation of heavy fighting in the spring. Controlling Kandahar City, the former spiritual and operational capital of the Taliban and Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand province are two critical targets. The two provinces are among the largest poppy growing areas in the country that have financed Taliban operations and fueled destructive warlord and criminal activity. Wresting control of the highways between Kabul, Kandahar, Lashkar Gah and Herat is of enormous importance to US/NATO forces. With the Karzai government and the ANA only controlling one (Kabul) of thirty four provinces in Afghanistan, the balance of the additional U.S. troops will be concentrated across the Pashtun ethnic belt in Eastern Afghanistan to “box in” the Taliban’s remaining forces.

As referenced in President Obama’s speech, the U.S. will also dramatically accelerate its training mission to field Afghan Natianal Army troops and police personnel. Revised targets for training point to 135,000 Afghan National Army troops being readied for action by the fall of 2010—roughly sixty percent of the 240,000 ANA forces General McChrystal called for by 2013. Other estimates include training an additional 40,000 police officers over the same time frame to increase their total force capacity to a 100,000 man force. With a 25% desertion rate for ANA forces, achieving training targets will be exceedingly difficult.

While the accelerated training schedules for ANA and police personnel is critical to President Obama’s plan to begin U.S. troop withdrawals in 2011, the survival of Afghanistan will turn on the Administration’s ability to meld together a coalition of warlord forces and tribal militias along with the ANA to defend the majority of the country against a Taliban takeover. The warlord and tribal militias are seasoned fighters, possess better equipment, are sufficiently ruthless and can navigate Afghanistan’s unforgiving terrain to go face-to-face with the Taliban.

The civil war to come in Afghanistan will pit the Taliban against the old Northern Alliance coalition of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbecks, Hazaras and other non-Pashtun groups who will refuse to live under Taliban rule again. Whether they can work together as an anti-Taliban military alliance is the seminal question. In this respect Russia, Iran and India may prove to be more influential than the U.S. in encouraging a coherent effort between the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Moscow, Tehran and New Delhi all backed Northern Alliance forces that helped topple the Taliban forces in 2001, and have maintained deep ties with the various non-Pashtun ethnic factions. The destabilizing threats posed by an Afghanistan’s exploding drug trade, thousands of refugees streaming across their borders and expanding networks of Taliban extremists operating in their security perimeters will force the governments of Russia, Iran, Pakistan and India to act.

The ramifications of President Obama’s decision to quit Afghanistan are far reaching and may set off a chain reaction of events that will dramatically reshape Afghanistan’s future and the geo-strategic equation in Central Asia. As for the United States strategic interests, it must be said that we are witnessing a clear reversal of American power in the region. With the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Shiaa ascendency in Iraq in 2005, the departure of U.S. armed forces from Afghanistan and Iraq is creating a great power vacuum in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. Once again, Afghanistan will sit at the eye of the storm of Central Asia’s Great Game.

Why President Obama Quit Afghanistan and the Civil

War to Come

by Webster Brooks

BFPR ANALYSIS