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I R A N

For the latest updates on Iran's elections

IRAN'S ELECTION RESULTS

Ahmadinejad 24,527,516

Mir Mousavi 13,216,411

Moshen Razai 678,240

Mehdi Karroubi 333,635

Total Votes Cast 39,165,191

Electoral Turnout 85%

June 14, 2009

What's Behing the Rigging of Iran's

Election for Ahmadinejad?

by Webster Brooks

Saturday’s announcement by Iran’s Interior Minister that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected with 63 percent of the vote set off a set a wave of violent clashes between protestors and government forces. The upsurge has shaken Iran’s ruling elite and exposed the election as a complete fraud before the world. As of this writing, protests are likely to continue despite the government’s massive crackdown. Incoming reports indicate that cell phone service in Tehran has been cut, thousands have been arrested and 50 protesters are rumored to have been killed. Police stormed the headquarters of Iran ’s largest reformist party, the Islamic Iran Participation Front and arrested several leaders. Facebook reports that Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ahmadinejad’s chief rival and Mehdi Karroubi are under house arrest. Access to Mousavi’s website has been blocked.

Manipulation at the margins of Iran’s election results is not new. However, the blatant irregularities and the lengths Iran’s establishment has gone to in order to secure Ahmadinejad’s “landslide” victory in the 2009 elections exceeds of all previous elections. How and why Iran’s clerical rulers and the power ministries controlled by the Revolutionary Guard overreached so badly, and then misjudged the peoples’ reaction to the rigged election is the question? The impact the protests will have on the Iranian establishment’s ability to consolidate power around Ahmadinejad’s tainted election may be far reaching. The shameful election is also a big source of concern that will complicate President Obama’s diplomatic overture to Tehran.

The Iranian ruler’s actions clearly show Ahmadinejad was the consensus pre-election designee. More importantly, they wanted nothing less than a landslide victory to demonstrate to the international community solid national support for their controversial leader. The nation’s elite concluded there was no need to change leadership as Iran has dramatically expanded its footprint across the Middle East over the past four years. Iran is now the undisputed leader of the anti-U.S. Middle East camp which includes Syria , Oatar, Hezbollah and HAMAS. Although Ahmadinejad’s statements denying the Holocaust and his strident anti-Israel rhetoric has earned him the reputation as a pariah in some international circles, the fact is that Iran is much more popular on the “Arab street” than the United States. Notwithstanding Ahmadinejad’s unsophisticated manner, Iran has a reputation of being the only nation that steadfastly defends the Palestinians, and the only Middle Eastern power that consistently delivers the weapons, food, financial assistance and social services supports on time. In fact, an argument can be made that Ahmadinejad’s inflamatory statements serve as useful distraction, that allow the “real work” of Iran pursuing its imperial ambitions to be conducted more effectively below the radar screen.

With President Obama on the defensive in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran ’s leaders are confident they can press ahead with their nuclear enrichment program. Ahmadinejad embodies Iran’s confrontational posture with the U.S. that has pushed America back on its heels. He is also the favorite of the hardcore conservative anti-American Revolutionary Guard, who Ayatollah Khahamei must keep on side to preserve the locus of their ruling partnership with conservative clerics.

Accordingly, the ruling elites did not want a run-off election between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, if he failed to win fifty percent of the vote–which apparently was going to happen. Not only would Ahmadinejad look weak, the nation would appear to be divided. As Saturday’s eruption on the streets proved, fixing one election is difficult enough. Rigging two elections in the space of seven days could have a big downside, even for an authoritarian state. Indeed Mousavi was gathering momentum. His criticism of the government and the energy unleashed around his candidacy breached the boundaries of an “acceptable opposition” candidate of the establishment. Ayatollah Khamenei had no choice but to short circuit the elections after the first round and endure the political blowback. When Ayatolla Khamenei issued a statement of congratulations on Saturday, two days before election results are normally announced and certified by the Electoral Commission, he was attempting to present the fraudulent results as a fait accompli that the electorate would have to swallow whole. What Iran’s clerical elite didn’t anticipate was Mousavi’s defiant stance and the fierce reaction it provoked among the youth. At a press conference after the polls closed on Friday, Mousavi said “I am the absolute winner of the election by a very wide margin. It is our duty to defend the people’s vote. There is no turning back.” Mousavi all but called on his supporters to prepare to go to the streets. Reports are circulating that on Saturday morning Mousavi was on his way to see the Ayatollah Khamenei when he was picked up by state intelligence officials. He never appeared for a scheduled 10:00 a.m. press conference on Saturday morning.

In addition to the protests in Tehran activities have broken out in other cities around Iran . While anger over the election results is widespread, many of the protestors who took in the streets are not necessarily Mousavi supporters, but youth who are targeting the entire establishment. Within the ranks of the “moderate camp” it has been reported that former President Hashemi Rafsanjani has resigned his position and head of the Expediency Council in protest of the results. Ahmadinejad ruthlessly attacked Rafsanjani during the election as stooge of the United States, colluding with America to undermine the Iranian state. Parliamentary leader Ali Larijani, Iran ’s former chief nuclear negotiator and critic of Ahmadinijad has been dispatched to Qum to talk with the clerical leadership.

The clerical elites are now on the hot seat to sell Ahmadinejad’s rump election. Iran ’s Interior Ministry reported Ahmadinejad won 24, 527,516 votes (62.7%) compared to Mousavi with 13,216,411 (33.7%). The two were followed by Mohsen Rezaei with 678,240 votes (1.73 percent) and Mehdi Karroubi with 333,635 votes (0.85 percent). According to some of results released Ahmadinejad carried almost every province with a similar percentage of the vote; a big departure from past elections where votes in the ethnic provinces have large variances than those from Iran ’s core urban areas. Ahmadinejad won the large northern city of Tabriz, the hometown of Mir Hussien Mousavi; a result most people agree is astonishing. He also won the city of Tehran where he popularity has plummeted due to his inability to deliver on economic reforms and mismanaging the government. Even less believable is the fact that Mehdi Karroubi did not win one percent of the vote. Possessing broad name recognition, and having run for president in 1995, Karroubi almost certainly should have gotton more than one percent of the ballots, especially in sections of Western Iran , where he remains a popular figure.

Where the struggle is headed in Iran over the next few days and weeks is hardly a settled question. Undoubtedly, the government will continue its crackdown and intimidation to end the protest. Whether they succeed is another matter. There is also the question of what to do with Mir Hussein Mousavi. He is an international figure now. Simply locking him away in jail or keeping him under house arrest hardly seems like a tenable position for the ruling elite to take, but they may certainly do so, while engaging to character assassination and possibly bringing charges against him for sedition.

As for the Obama Administration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tried to put as much distance between the United States and the Iranian government as possible. Clinton said “We are monitoring the situation as it unfolds in Iran, but we, like the rest of the world, are waiting and watching to see what the Iranian people decide.” The White House issued a two sentence statement saying there are “concerns about irregularities” that occured. Although White House officials privately concede that Mousavi’s position on the nuclear issue did not substantially differ from Ahmadinejad’s, they certainty were hoping for a Mousavi victory. Presumably the Obama administration has been waiting for Iran’s presidential elections to end before more seriously testing the diplomatic waters with Iran. President Obama has made several overtures restating his interest in diplomatic engagement with Tehran; all of which have met with a cool response. With Ahmadinejad’s tainted election victory, Obama’s pursuit the prospects of engagement with Iran has probably taken a turn for the worse.

Analysis by Webster Brooks

June 20, 2009

Iran’s “Velvet Revolution is fast approaching the tipping point of passing over to a violent struggle for power between the radicalized reformists movement led by Mir Hussein Mousavi and Iran’s clerical establishment led by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. On Saturday, in a speech in Southwest Tehran Mousavi said that he is “ready for martyrdom” and according to a Reuters news report called for a national strike if he is arrested. Mousavi’s bold statements are a direct challenge to Ayatollah Khamenei’s clerical rule. A call for a national strike would potentially expand the student-based protest movement to include merchants, professionals and the middle class. By saying he is “ready for martyrdom,” Mousavi delivered a stunning rebuke to Ayatollah Khamenei’s ultimatum issued on Friday, saying “I call on all to put an end to this method [street demonstrations]… If they don’t, the political leaders will be held responsible for the chaos and the consequences.” Mousavi has now passed the point of no return. He has all but dared the government to arrest him, and has placed his fate in the hands of Iranians who are willing to risk their lives and futures on an uncertain challenge for power. But what are the chances that the mass protests will pass over to a revolution or a decisive shakeup in the clerical establish that runs Iran along with the Revolution Guard?

The chances that Iran’s clerical establishment will be overthrown by a new democratically led government are remote but not impossible for three reasons. First, Mousavi’s youth and student dominated reformist movement cannot force a change in Iran’s leadership structure unless its support broadens to encompass, the middle class, workers, professionals and the highly influential merchant class. It was this base coalition along with the clerics that overthrew the Shah in the 1979 revolution that ultimately to led to Ayatollah Khomeni’s ascendance to power. In this regard, Mousavi’s call for a general strike if he is arrested has a deliberate strategic implication to expand his reformists forces. If his movement can draw a sizable section of these different constituencies into the opposition it is likely that the moderate-conservative clerical wing led by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani will cross over to support the removal of Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei to avoid the possibility of massive bloodletting and civil war. Moreover, while the central theater of action has been the struggle in the streets of Tehran, Mousavi’s forces must demonstrate strength in Iran’s other major cities. While there have been sporadic reports of protest in Ishfahan, Tabriz and Shiraz, it remains to be seen if the rest of the country is prepared to follow events in Tehran. Another critical factor will be Iran’s large minority populations of Kurds, Azeri, Arabs and Balochis. Should these groups seize the moment to start pressing for more demands for autonomy from Tehran in line with Mousavi’s reformist upsurge, Iran could be headed for massive nationwide chaos.

Second, Mousavi will have to ultimately win the support of part of Iran’s clerical establishment which is not a political or religious monolith. In addition to Ayatollah Khamenei’s hard line anti-U.S. conservative clerics who are committed to running an Islamic state, Mousavi, former President Khatami and presidential candidate Medhi Korrubi represent a section of the political elite that are aggressively pushing the clerics to open up more democratic institutions. They want to restrict the growing power of the Revolutionary Guard and relax of social norms, particularly for women. There is also a strong moderate conservative pragmatists wing led by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani and Iranian Parliamentary leader Ali Larijani. These moderate-conservatives have advocated for improving Iran’s woeful economic conditions that have deteriorated under Ahmadinejad. They have also called for an end to Iran’s economic isolation from the global economy and talks with the United States. In many ways, the powerful Rafsanjani may hold the key to the resolution of Iran’s crisis. While he has remained in the background during the protests and not supported Mousavi openly, his daughter appeared at a pro-Mousavi rally. Rafsanjani is strategically positioned to be pivotal player as leader of the Assembly of Experts who select and can dismiss the Supreme Leader. He is also leader of Iran’s Expediency Council that resolves disputes between Iran’s leading governmental agencies. It is no coincidence that during the presidential campaign Ahmadinejad unleashed a volley of verbal assaults against Rafsanjani as being a collaborator with the United States and an opponent of the Islamic state. Behind the scenes both Rafsanjani and Larijani are working the clerical establishment to gauge the twist and turns of the struggle for power. If the crisis matures and Rafsanjani openly sides with Mousavi and the reformist forces, Ayatollah Khamenei’s days are numbered.

Finally, it is doubtful that the Revolutionary Guard and the paramilitary Basij forces will allow Ayatollah Khamenei to be removed from power without a fight. Despite the concentration of power in the hands of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, his authority is highly dependent upon the formidable military power of the Revolutionary Guard that also solidly backs Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Revolutionary Guard is not simply a military and intelligence unit. They run and influence many of the governmental “power ministries” and are deeply embedded in the economic wellsprings of the nation. Most importantly, the Revolutionary Guard is instrumental in Iran’s emerging nuclear program and its growing foreign policy and military influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories.

Thus far, the Revolutionary Guard have not been called out in full force to drown the revolt in blood. Although Ayatollah Khamenei has made it clear that continued demonstrations will be severely dealt with, he is trying to avoid at all cost a massive bloody crackdown on the opposition. However, should the reformers challenge to Ayatollah Khamenei’s rule continue to grow, the Revolutionary Guard will be confronted with a tricky dilemma; whether to crush the opposition by brute force or seek out another member of the clerical establishment to replace Khamenei. While their loyalty is to Ayatollah Khamenei, their larger interest is to maintain their own power, with or without him.

The situation in Iran has grown increasingly fluid and the unfolding events are clearly headed toward a decisive showdown. The government’s press blackouts and attempts to shut down opposition websites, Facebook and Twitter have only been partially successful in blunting the opposition’s determination to change the face of Iran. What is clear is that Mousavi has thrown down the gauntlet to Supreme Leader Khamenei and the resistance is responding. Whether the opposition can grow fast enough and strong enough is the seminal question. Mousavi’s forces have the momentum and the bodies. Ayatollah Khamenei still maintains substantial if not deteriorating support. He also has preponderance of force and coercion on his side in the ranks of the Revolutionary Guard. Unless Mousavi’s opposition movement can sustain their momentum and expand their ranks to include the middle class, merchants, workers and the support of the moderate-conservative clerics led by Rafsanjani, Iran’s Velvet Revolution is likely to be soaked in blood.

Will Iran's Democratic Upsurge Pass Over to Revolution?

Washington, D.C. --- At the July G-8 Summit in Italy, President Obama delivered a clear ultimatum to Iran; bring your nuclear program into compliance with binding international treaties by September or face crippling sanctions. Defying United Nations Security Council non-proliferation protocols, Iran has refused to suspend its uranium enrichment activities. Iran has also rebuffed IAEA efforts to conduct full inspections of its nuclear sites while increasing its production and stockpiling of reactor grade enriched uranium. With its nuclear dossier scheduled for review at the September G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, President Obama is expected to back his ultimatum with decisive action to dissuade Iran from continuing its nuclear program or submit to more intrusive inspections. But the tough rhetoric, economic sanctions and military buildup that will be directed against Iran in the coming months will largely represent President Obama’s new “containment strategy” of Iran as a presumed nuclear power. Iran is on the brink of a "nuclear breakout" and there is little President Obama or anyone else can do to stop it.

In the days ahead, President Obama’s response to contain Iran's aggressive nuclear agenda will unfold along two tracks; working with America’s allies to levy economic sanctions against Tehran on the one hand, and building up military deterrence against Iran in the Persian Gulf on the other. The Obama administration cannot avert a nuclear arms race in the volatile Middle East unless it deploys credible force in the region to assure its allies that potential Iranian aggression will be thwarted. At a July 23, conference in Thailand, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that the United States may erect a "defense umbrella" over the Middle East if Tehran continues its nuclear program.

Given the high probability that Iran will master the nuclear fuel cycle in the next few years, it’s critical that President Obama delivers the toughest sanctions possible against Tehran starting at the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit. To allow Iran to flaunt non-proliferation treaties without a strong American response would further degrade U.S. power globally, as is the case now with President Obama’s tepid response to North Korea’s provocative actions. Although economic sanctions against Iran over the last three decades failed to topple the clerical establishment or force it off the nuclear path, they have seriously impacted Iran’s economic platform.

Economic sanctions will be a more potent weapon in President Obama’s arsenal. Lower oil prices have depleted Iran’s cash reserves and President Ahmadinejad’s mismanagement of the economy has exacerbated unemployment and inflationary pressures. Iran’s ruling establishment is also politically weaker in the aftermath of the post-election uprisings than at any time since the 1979 revolution. Spontaneous and organized outbreaks of protests against Supreme Leader Khamanei and President Ahmadinejad continue; each pregnant with the possibility of metastasizing into a larger conflagration. Tough economic sanctions in concert with efforts by opposition forces in Iran’s parliament seeking to derail Ahmadinejad’s economic agenda and force him from office could prove to be surprisingly effective. It should also be noted that the Obama administration has maintained George Bush’s 2007 “Presidential Finding” authorizing covert activities inside Iran to destabilize its government, including sabotaging key economic targets. Iran’s economy is rapidly taking on a new political dimension.

President Obama’s challenge is to work effectively with his European allies and other reliable nations to tighten the noose on Iran. Crafting diluted sanctions in an effort to win China and Russia's acceptance will be counterproductive, and could sidetrack Obama's efforts to unite countries behind the strongest sanctions possible. Measures to further restrict loans to Iran from financial institutions like the World Bank and targeting loans to Iran for its proposed natural gas pipeline project to India via Pakistan are under consideration. Targeted sanctions will also be directed at loans to Iran’s vital state dominated industries, particularly defense related sectors controlled by the Revolutionary Guard. For all these reasons, President Obama needs to manage and orchestrate the imposition of sanctions against Iran quickly with a minimum of squabbling amongst his allies and the U.S. Congress. It also means Obama must oppose calls to impose a gas embargo on Iran that would divide his international coalition between supporters and opponents. A gas embargo is considered an act of war. It also carries the additional risk of dramatically raising oil prices and igniting a new round of global recession.

Assembling a credible military deterrent in the Persian Gulf against a potential nuclear armed Iran will be a far more difficult enterprise for President Obama While not treating Iran as if it is already a nuclear power, the Obama administration’s must take tangible steps to demonstrate to its friends in Egypt, Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council states (Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia) that they will be protected against Iranian imperial designs. As Secretary of State Clinton already suggested, new radar and missile defense systems and a naval fleet with nuclear weapons will need to be deployed in the Persian Gulf. Greater cooperation between the intelligence and security agencies of America's European and the Middle East allies will be essential to safeguard against Iran “leaking” nuclear technology and materials.

Monitoring Iran’s potential delivery systems and enhanced interdiction measures under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are integral to any new deterrance architecture and will require a costly long-term commitment. Given Israel’s lobbying efforts for airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear grid every effort must be made to avoid a miscalculation. The possibility of a “manufactured crisis” that provides justification for Israel to attack Iran cannot be discounted. It is assumed that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu would only launch surgical airstrikes against Iranian nuclear targets with the approval of President Obama. That is a dangerous assumption. Such an attack might degrade Iran’s nuclear program and possibly set its timetable back a couple of years, but ultimately it would not eliminate Iran’s nuclear program. The political and military blowback across the Middle East that would result from an Israeli attack on Iran would put U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan at even greater risk and unleash a wave of anti-American sentiment that would redound to every corner of the Middle East.

Finally, beyond the two-track strategy of sanctions and deterrence to contain a “nuclear armed Iran,” there is another dangerous contingency the Obama administration must prepare for; Iran exploding a nuclear device without warning. Historically, France, North Korea, China, India, Pakistan and South Africa all detonated nuclear devices without warning after camouflaging their military nuclear programs behind claims of developing civil nuclear power. If and when Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, it will likely pursue a similar path. The Obama administration must be prepared with an appropriate response if a snap announcement is made that Iran has successfully tested a nuclear bomb.

Whether Iran seeks to “go nuclear” primarily to deter perceived American and Israeli attempts to foment regime change remains to be seen. Increasingly, international acceptance that a nuclear armed Iran will simply have to be tolerated is trending upward. And, many observers feel a nuclear armed Iran will not necessarily pose a threat to the general peace of the Middle East. Iran’s nuclear program continues to generate more questions than answers. What the world is waiting on now is a reply from President Obama at the G-20 Summit.

When Iran Defies President Obama's Nuclear Ultimatum What Happens Next?

September 1, 2009