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Iraq’s Successful Provincial Elections Auger Well for Obama’s Troop Withdrawal Plan

Israel'sGaza Invasion and Obama's One and One-Half State Solution

The Remaking of Muqtada al Sadr:

A Turkish Tale..........

The United Nations Recommends

Power Sharing Plan for Kirkuk........

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US Approves $1.9 Billion in Aid for Pakistan................................

Netanyahu wants to replace Road

Map with Triple Track...................

Interview With David Shenker on Lebanon’s 2009 Elections the Cedar Revolution

Obama and Egypt's Coming Succession Crisis...............

Elections Analysis - May 16, 2009

The specter of a Hezbollah-led coalition victory in Lebanon’s June 7 parliamentary elections looms large over the Middle East. Under Hassan Nasrallah’s leadership, Hezbolla’s March 8 Coalition is on the threshold of ruling the Arab world’s most ethnically and religiously diverse democracy. With all the legitimate instruments of state power at Nasrallah’s disposal, Lebanon’s transformation from a weak Balkanized state into a fortress of Iranian influence in the Levant is a foreboding certainty. Bracing for a strategic setback in the region, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made an unannounced stop in Beirut on April 27 to assess the situation and reassure America’s Lebanese allies they would not be abandoned in tough times. Laying flowers on the grave of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Clinton pledged support for the “voices of moderation”—the pro-American “March 14” Cedar Coalition led by Saad Hariri, (Rafik Hariri’s son) and promised that the Obama administration’s dialogue with Syria would not compromise Lebanon’s sovereignty.

With three weeks left until Election Day, the Shiia Hizbollah and AMAL parties’ alliance with Michael Aoun’s Christian Maronite forces have seized the political momentum. Flush with money and a wielding a formidable organization on the ground, the March 8 Coalition is superbly positioned to defeat Hariri’s “Cedar” alliance. The majority of Sunni Muslims, Druze forces and micro-Christian parties supporting the Cedar coalition hold a 70-58 advantage over the Hizbolla bloc in the 128 member National Assembly. With the Sunni and Shiia vote evenly divided between the Cedar March 14 bloc and the Hizbollah March 8th coalition, the election’s outcome will likely be determined by the Christian Maronite swing vote with 34 seats in parliament. Michael Aoun, the once powerful anti-Syrian Christian Maronite Prime Minister and Lebanese Army Commander has emerged as the pivotal figure in the election. After returning from a 15 year exile, Aoun switched sides in 2006 to support Hezbollah. Visiting Damascus in 2008, the general who led Lebanese forces into battle against Syrian troops was greeted as a kingmaker. Aoun's Free Democratic Movement captured 70% of the Christian vote in the 2005 elections. Hezbollah is confident that the influential Aoun can deliver a substantial margin of the Christian electorate to give them a working majority in the parliament. In exchange for delivering votes to the Hezbollah-AMAL bloc, Aoun is reeping the rewards of Syrian and Iranian largesse in the form of security guarantees for Christian Maronite communities, campaign funding, additional National Assembly seats and a patronage machine to reward friends.

In addition to its strategic alliance with Michael Aoun, Hezbollah is riding the headwinds of change to victory as recent developments have dramatically strengthened their petition for leadership. On April 29, the United Nations tribunal investigating Rafik Hariri's death ordered the release of the four generals jailed in 2005 in connection with the assassination. The tribunal ruled that the evidence was "not sufficiently credible to request their maintenance in detention." The freeing of the generals who were never charged with a crime was an international embarrassment for Hariri’s coalition who implicated Syria for the murder and demanded the generals’ incarceration. At the celebration of their release in North Beirut the four men praised Hassan Nasrallah for Hezbollah’s long standing support. Nasrallah immediately called on the United Nations Tribunal to continue its investigation, suggesting that Hariri’s murder was plotted in Israel. At the same time that Hariri’s bloc was reeling from the U.N. tribunals’ decision, Hezbollah and Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces (ISF) stepped up its arrests of Lebanese nationals caught spying for Israel. On May 12, Hezbollah held a press conference showcasing captured surveillance equipment used to track its member’s movements and transmit information back to Israel. The irony of the moment could not be missed; Hezbollah working closely with the ISF that was trained and financed by the U.S. to put them out of business. The ongoing operation that netted 26 arrests and shut down nine Israeli sleeper cells is further evidence of Hezbollah’s growing power in Lebanon.

While Hezbollah is surging, there is growing dissension in the Cedar forces ranks. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s criticism of the leadership’s narrow focus on Syrian interference in Lebanon’s affairs underscored the fundamental weakness of the March 14 movement; its inability to govern effectively and provide critical services to its citizens. Indeed, Hezbollah’s key to success in Lebanon is not its militias, advanced weaponry or legendary war effort that turned back Israel’s 2006 invasion. Its core asset is providing housing, food, water, schools, hospitals and vital social services to its Shiia constituency and others. As one of Syria ’s most vocal critics and fierce opponents of Hezbollah, Jumblatt’s comments angered his March 14 Coalition members and Obama administration officials who need a strong turnout of Druze voters to carry the elections. Jumblatt’s statement also provoked speculation that he may switch sides to Hezbollah’s camp. Jumblatt crossing over to support Hezbolla is unlikely, but the crafty veteran of several Lebanese wars recognizes that the balance of forces is tilting toward Hezbollah. In the unlikely event that the March 14th Cedar forces prevail in the elections, Hezbollah would still maintain its legislative veto in the National Assembly and the ability to block any measures that diminish its powers. Hezbollah’s militia and proxy forces would continue to control most of the country, including Beirut ’s critical seaport and airport. Over time Hezbollah will also co-opt Lebanon’s National Army and Internal Security Force, as is already occurring. Although speculation continues that Hezbollah might dispatch its militia to shut down the elections and the government if the voting isn’t going its way, Hezbollah is clearly mounting an all out campaign to win a “clean election” at the ballot box. In the final analysis, whether Hezbollah wins the June 7 elections or not, it will effectively control Lebanon in the fullness of time.

The Obama administration came to office with few if any options to slow Hezbollah’s reach for power in Lebanon. The U.S. funded a Lebanese army that cannot defeat Hezbollah on the battlefield. The United Nations resolution calling for Hezbollah to disarm could not be enforced. America, Saudi Arabia and several European countries financed and endorsed the Cedar movement that hasn’t effectively governed or expanded its political influence beyond its base. Although President Obama recently suggested that American financial aid to Lebanon will be cut if Hezbollah wins the elections, America’s attempts to isolate Hezbollah, as they did with HAMAS will be far more difficult. Hezbollah is not an isolated group. It has deep roots among the Shiia, a strong coalition among the Christian Maronite community and scattered support in the Sunni and Druze communities. On the international front, Britain has already announced it will enter into a dialogue with Hezbollah, and it is only a matter of time before other European nations follow suite. Despite the U.S.’s designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, only three other countries have labeled Hezbollah as a terrorist group ( Israel , Canada and the Netherlands ).

A Hezbollah victory in Lebanon ’s June 7 parliamentary elections will further erode American power in the Middle East at a time when the U.S. is on the defensive in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Obama administration’s curious attempt to coax Syria out of Iran’s orbit will be severely undermined if not completely derailed by Hezbollah’s victory. Similarly, the administration’s strategy to promote al Fatah as the sole representative of the Palestinian people to the exclusion of HAMAS will encounter increased resistance on the Arab Street and in Tehran. In Europe, and among a growing number of American policy makers, calls for the U.S. to negotiate with HAMAS are heard with increased frequency. Across the Middle East Hezbollah’s victory will further unsettle the regimes of Arab Sunni sheikdoms fearful of Iran’s growth as the dominant regional force and the threat of rising Shiia movements within their countries. Hassan Nasrallah’s triumph in Lebanon is the product of 20 years of Iranian involvement to cultivate and methodically raise Hezbollah to power--perfecting the art of running a proxy state along the way.

President Obama recently stated at the Summit of the America’s meeting, that he would respect the "legitimacy" of all democratically elected governments, even if the US "might not be happy" with the results of any elections. On June 8, the President will get the chance to live up to his word when the Lebanese people speak at the polls.

Hezbollah's Road to Power in Lebanon's June 7 Parliamentary Elections

June 9, 2009

President Obama’s risky commitment to forge a diplomatic breakthrough on a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has placed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s regime in a perilous position. Already the target of mounting criticism across the Middle East for his complicity in Tel Aviv’s war against HAMAS, Mubarak’s support and engagement is indispensable to reaching any agreement between Israel and the Palestinians—but at what costs to Egypt?

Since Israel’s December 2008 invasion of Gaza, developments in the Levant are forcing Mubarak to adapt to changing internal and external circumstances or risk further destablization of his government. With HAMAS reconstituting its ranks, an irredentist Netanyahu government back in power in Israel and heightened pressure to end his crackdown on political opposition groups in Egypt, the landmines Mubarak has to negotiate are eroding his powerbase in Egypt and the Middle East.

For the 81 year-old Mubarak who threw Egypt’s weight behind Tel Aviv’s attempt to dismember HAMAS, an Israeli victory would have strengthened his grip on power and created a smoother path for the succession of his son, Gamal to the presidency. Had HAMAS been forced to surrender leadership to Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestinian Authority, their radical influence in GAZA and Egypt would be diminished and Iran’s expanding regional influence temporarily blunted. But that didn’t happen. Instead, HAMA’s support is growing on the “Arab street.” Worse still, HAMAS and Hezbollah weapons smuggling operations on the Gaza border has spread to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. In April, the Egyptian government arrested 49 people, including one Hezbollah agent charged with smuggled arms to Gaza and plotting attacks on tourist sites in the Sinai. Egyptian officials also reported that Hezbollah agents were “scouting” the Suez Canal, possibly in search of targets to hit that would cripple two of Egypt’s largest industries; tourism and maritime commerce.

In response to the arrest, Hezbollah’s mercurial leader Hassan Nasrallah boldly admitted one of his operatives was providing assistance to HAMAS after Egypt’s closure of the Rafah crossing left thousands of Palestinians without food, medicine and arms. However, Nasrallah excoriated Mubarak for suggesting Hezbollah was attempting to overthrow the Egyptian government, calling it a smear campaign to diminish Hezbollah’s support before Lebanon’s critical June 7 parliamentary elections. The war of words between Beirut and Cairo sent shock waves across the region. President Mubarak escalated regional tension by pointing to Tehran as the source of the subversion. In a provocative speech given in April, Mubarak said “We will not allow any interference by foreign forces that push the region towards hell out of a desire to spread their influence and agenda on the Arab world.”

Wheather Iran is pushing the Middle East "towards hell" may be debatable; the dramatic expansion of Iranian power in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza on Egypt's border is not. Mubarak's tough talk was no doubt sincere. Iran has Egypt in its sites. But Mubarak was also sending a message to the Obama administration, that his neighborhood has changed and that Egypt needs to acquire advanced weapons systems from Washington. In the past America's practice of maintaining Israel's "qualitative military edge" has resulted in U.S. denials of TOW missles and Joint Direct Attack Munitions to Egypt. Mubarak has also bristled at U.S. sales of sophisticated weapons to the Gulf States that are still denied to Cairo. The differences between the U.S and Egypt aren't so much about particular weapons systems but Egypt's role in the region. America's insistance that Egypt play a more active regional role monitoring strategic waterways, contributing troops to expeditionary forces and peacekeeping operations has been resisted by Egypt.

Acutely aware of the challenges threatening to undermine the stability of Mubarak’s government, the Obama administration has engaged in a flurry of political, economic and military activities to fortify Egypt’s position. Egypt’s selection as the site for Obama’s seminal address to the “Muslim world” was an opportunity to begin the renovation of its declining image in the region. At the same time, U.S. pressure on Mubarak to ease the crackdown on opposition groups led Egyptian courts to throw out Saad Eddin Ibrahim’s trumped-up conviction for treason. Opposition leader Ayman Nour, who challenged Mubarak in Egypt’s 2005 presidential election, was also freed from prison in February 2009 on phony charges of fraud. He has been banned from seeking office and practicing law. The Obama administration also lobbied Muburak to have leading opposition figures and members of the Islamist group Egyptian Brotherhood present at his Cairo address. As an inducement for Egypt to open up its political system, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that America’s annual $1.3 billion military aid package will not be conditioned on Egypt’s adherence to human rights standards–a source of contention between Mubarak and the former Bush administration. While the Obama administration has impressed upon Cairo the need to open up political breathing space for its critics, Mubarak is not convinced. No one doubts that if the Egyptian Brotherhood party was legalized that they would sweep Egypt’s parliamentary elections and the presidency in the upcoming 2011 elections.

While the debate in Washington continues to rage about the Egyptian Brotherhood’s role in Egyptian politics, they remain the largest and most significant opposition group in Egypt. Mubarak’s crackdown on the organization has resulted in hundreds of its members being jailed and prohibited from engaging in political activities. Although officially banned in Egypt since 1954, its members operate hospitals, schools and other charities and have considerable influence among many of the country’s 76 million people. Its lawmakers, running as “independents” in the 2005 elections hold 88 seats in Egypt’s 454-seat parliament. Mubarak’s National Democratic Party controls 311 seats in Egypt’s virtual single party state. Having long forsaken violence and terrorism and promoting a more moderate democratic brand of Islamism, the Egyptian Brotherhood’s close ties with HAMAS has placed them at the top of Mubarak’s enemies list.

Mubarak’s draconian measures have generated considerable anger and protest throughout Egyptian society, but his saving grace has been the inability of the opposition, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, to effectively organize Egypt’s disparate political constituencies into a united front. Independent journalists, bloggers and lawyers have also been broadly targeted across Egypt for similar treatment. Despite the increasingly bitter Sunni-Shiite divide in the Middle East, a 2007 Pew Research Poll revealed that in predominantly Sunni Muslim Egypt, 40 percent of all Egyptians had a favorable view of Hezbollah Shiite cleric Hassan Nasrallah and support for HAMAS was above 60 percent--an astonishing indication of the political ferment roiling in Egypt.

Egypt’s stagnant economy has also been a source of discord among the broad mass of Egyptian society. While the Egyptian ruling elites differ markedly from the opulent royal families and sheiks of the Gulf oil states, the most powerful members of the National Democratic Party are deeply tied in with the nation’s major economic industries. With inflation creeping up to 18 percent and one in four young Egyptians idling in unemployment it is not surprising that Egypt’s chronic economic underperformance is laid at Mubarak and the NDP’s doorstep. Urgent improvements are needed in the Egypt. Roughly 30 percent of all Egyptians live in poverty and 20 percent of Egypt’s 79 million people live on less than $2 a day according to the United Nations. To help bolster Egypt’s sagging economy, Barak Obama and Hosni Mubarak signed a “United States-Egypt Plan for a Strategic Partnership” in May 2009. Leading officials from the U.S. and Egypt are scheduled to develop a framework over the next three months for trade and investment cooperation.

Given all the challenges President Mubarak faces in Egypt, his weariness regarding Obama’s determination to secure a breakthrough on the two-state solution is colored by his sense of history. Since Jimmy Carter left the White House in 1980, all his presidential successors have been seduced by illusions of grandeur, vanity and presidential legacy to bring peace to the Israeli-Palistinian conflict. Mubarak has seen it all; last minute deals, quick fixes and piecemeal agreements. Oslo, Wye River, Annapolis...the road to peace is littered with the names of conferences and agreements that have all failed.

Early in his administration, Barak Obama has decided that the moment to advance the cause of the two-state solution is now. Despite America's heavy committments to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; despite Netanyahu's hardline position on a two state solution, and despite the deep even violent split between HAMAS and the Palestinian Authority, President Obama' is pressing hard for progress. With Hezbollah on the verge of victory in Lebanon's elections and HAMAS's influence in Gaza bleeding into Egypt, perhaps President Obama senses that the U.S. must try to sieze back the initiative.

Obama's blunt and painfully truthful address in Cairo made it clear to all parties involved that they must discard the baggage of the past and be prepared to make risky compromises to reach a durable peace between Palestine and Israel. It is precisely those risks that Egypt as a frontline player must take that threatens the regime of President Mubarak.

Obama's Call for Two-State Solution Places Egypt in a Perilous Position

by Webster Brooks

Al Queda’s shift in global strategy to transform Yemen into a platform to destabilize Saudi Arabia represents the most serious national security crisis the Obama administration has confronted. Saudi Arabia is the strategic lynchpin of energy security powering the U.S. dominated global order. Any chaos, instability or leadership change in Riyadh that disrupts Saudi oil production could trigger price shocks, a global economic downturn and enhance Iran’s status as the dominant regional hegemon in the Middle East. Osama bin Ladin’s escalation of attacks against the House of Saud comes at a time when U.S. military forces are overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq and American public opinion is staunchly opposed to another military intervention. Given the constraints on his administration’s capacity to commit ground forces to the region, Obama must now rely on President Ali Saleh’s faltering regime to eliminate Al Queda’s growing presence in Yemen’s vast ungoverned spaces. AQAP’s sudden emergence as a serious threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia is not accidental; it is product of Osama bin Ladin’s long-term strategic planning.

Over the past year Osama Bin Ladin has merged his Saudi Arabia and Yemen operations into Al Queda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Led by Nasser Wahayshi and his Saudi deputy, Saeed al-Shihri, AQAP includes veterans from its defeated insurgency in Saudi Arabia two years ago, along with recruits from Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. The new franchise has established command structures, communications lines, base areas and bomb making factories that fabricated new stealth PETN explosives recently tested in Saudi Arabia and the United States. By claiming responsibility for Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s Christmas Day attempt to blow up the flight from Amsterdam to Detroit and the August 2009 suicide bomber attack on Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohemmend bin Nayef, AQAP has signaled that its presence in Yemen will be permanent, lethal and have global reach.

Al Queda’s strategy in Yemen seeks to leverage the current crisis of President Saleh’s weak regime into a “state of controlled chaos” that will facilitate AQAP’s a long-term presence to conduct operations that undermine the Saudi government. To that end Bin Ladin’s forces are not necessarily seeking the overthrow of President Saleh’s regime. Quite the opposite, as long as President Saleh’s government remains weak and isolated AQAP’s capacity to expand its base in Yemen will grow. This explains why Al Queda is content with operating “in the seam” of the two insurgencies buffeting President Saleh’s regime; one led by the broad-based Southern Movement to secede from the central government, and the other a tenacious Shiaa-based Al Houthi insurgency backed by Iran along Yemen’s northern border with Saudi Arabia. Both movements serve AQAP’s tactical and strategic goals in Yemen, but in different ways.

That the Sunni dominated AQAP is the beneficiary of the Shia-based Al Houthi’s two-front war against Yemen’s central government and Saudi Arabia is a peculiar irony of the crisis. The Al Houthi’s border war with Saudi Arabia is destabilizing the Saudi royal family, the Saudi army and inflaming the passions of the Kingdom’s oppressed Shia minority concentrated around its eastern oilfields. For months Riyadh denied that its troops were engaging Al Houthi’s forces on the ground and that Saudi jets were carpet bombing Al Houthi camps. On December 24, the Saudi government reluctantly announced that 70 Saudi soldiers were killed in fierce border clashes. Desperate to liquidate the Al Houthi Shia rebellion on its border, Saudi Arabia has stepped up its bombing campaign and artillery shelling of Al Houthi positions. Riyadh has also tried to deflect the growing political backlash across the Middle East to the atrocities it is committing against the Al Houthi by claiming Iran is supplying funds and weapons to the insurgents–claims that have yet to be substantiated. Thus, the Al Houthi insurgency serves AQAP’s interests on two fronts; destabilizing the Saudi government with its border war on the one hand and draining President Saleh’s government, army and national resources on the other.

AQAP’s relationship to the secessionist Southern Movement (SM) pivots on maintaining friendly neutrality in order to operate and sustain its base camps in eastern and southern Yemen. As a democratic alliance of Nasserites, socialists, labor and business leaders the Southern Movement and Al Queda do not share a common political program or ideology. Nevertheless, the Southern Movement’s anti-American sentiments and its struggle to secede from President Saleh’s U.S.-backed government has positioned the coalition and AQAP on the same side of the political divide. The complication facing the Obama administration in attacking AQAP’s southern bases were evident when U.S. cruise missiles raked the villages of Arhab and Abyan and Shabwah in December. The attacks were not only condemned by local tribal elders but Southern Movement leader Abbass al Asal characterized the strikes as a “genocidal attack on the people of the south, not Al Queda.” The gruesome scenes of 30 dead Yemeni villagers and five AQAP operatives were broadcast across the Middle East on Al Jazeera. The following day, 10,000 people attended a rally held by the SM’s Joint Meeting Parties which condemned “American targeting of civilians.” President Saleh also came under fire as a “U.S. puppet regime” for his army’s role in supporting the cruise missile attacks on Al Queda. The net political effect of the air strikes sparked anti-American rage and further undermined President Saleh’s government while fostering more support for Al Queda. Thus Al Queda is able to use the Southern Movement as a buffer that provides it with political cover and limits America’s freedom to conduct air strikes and Predator drone attacks that invariably kill civilians. In the future, Al Queda will undoubtedly attempt to co-opt elements of the Southern Movement’s diverse coalition in order to broaden its influence and enhance the security of its base operations. Should the Southern Movement formally break away from the Saleh government to re-establish an independent Republic of South Yemen (1967-1990) AQAP’s relationship to the new government will emerge as a crucial issue. A new government in South Yemen could conceivably sanction Al Queda’s presence and further complicate U.S. counter-terrorist operations.

In response to the AQAP’s offensive, President Obama pledged $70 million to Yemen’s government, increased Special Forces deployments to “train” Yemeni counter-terrorist units and launched cruise missile strikes against Al Queda bases in mid-December. Notwithstanding President Obama’s countermeasures, it’s clear his administration does not have a thoughtful strategy to neutralize Al Queda in Yemen. Indeed, the U.S. intelligence community’s failure to recognize the seriousness of AQAP’s buildup and new capabilities until Abdulmutallab’s failed Christmas bombing attempt has left the Obama administration desperately playing catch-up.

The Obama administration needs a practical strategy to neutralize Al Queda in Yemen. Such a strategy must begin with preventing the collapse of President Saleh’s regime which cannot survive fighting three insurgencies simultaneously. The Southern Movement and the Al Houthi insurgents are not calling for the overthrow of President Saleh’s government; both seek to break away from the Yemen’s corrupt and criminal regime. Therefore, the Obama administration must convince President Saleh that significant concessions must be made to the Al Houthi and the Southern Movement to stabilize his regime, preserve Yemen’s sovereignty and isolate AQAP. In short, both groups will have to be offered some form of regional autonomy and Yemen must be transformed into a federated state with the central government possessing limited powers.

The most critical first step for the Obama administration to undertake is convincing President Saleh and Saudi Arabia’s leaders to agree to an immediate and unconditional cease fire with the Al Houthi insurgents. Further, the cease fire should include a pledge to enter into negotiations on regional autonomy for the Al Houthi’s, a settlement of Saudi border security issues and Al Houthi representation in a restructured national government. President Saleh’s current Six Point plan to implement a cease fire is nothing more than a call for the Al Houthi’s total surrender. It is a non-starter that should be scrapped immediately. A negotiated cease fire will dramatically reduce pressure on Yemen and Saudi Arabia’s government and limit Iran’s maneuvering room to become more deeply entangled in an insurgency on Saudi Arabia’s border.

Similarly, the Obama administration should enlist the services of a skilled mediator (preferably Qatar’s government) to convene talks between Sana’a and the Southern Movement. Qatar negotiated a cease fire between President Saleh and the Southern Movement in 2007 and is considered by both sides as an impartial mediator. Unless the Southern Movement is offered regional autonomy that grants sweeping autonomous powers similar to those enjoyed by Kurdistan today, it is doubtful that reconciliation can be achieved. In addition to a regional autonomy agreement, Southern Movement representatives must be brought into significant leadership roles in Yemen’s central government to ensure that equity, transparency and reforms are implemented. Anything short of giving Southern Movement representatives a significant role in governing a reformed Yemen, including demands that President Saleh step down as President will justifiably be rejected. President Saleh will not be disposed to concede autonomy to the Southern Movement or the Al Houthi, but a partitioned Yemen and the creation of a new breakaway republic in South Yemen will open the door to more instability in the region, particularly from Iran which has the economic largesse and proximate skills to stand-up a proxy state.

The concessions and compromises that President Saleh must make to the Al Houthi’s and the Southern Movement will dramatically alter the nature of Yemen’s embattled government. However, the alternative is more chaos, civil war, the likely breakup of the state and an enlarged presence of Iran and Al Queda on the peninsula. Arguably, it may already be too late for the United States and their allies to prevent the breakup of Yemen and the collapse of the Saleh regime. AQAP has the momentum. Osama Bin Ladin is dictating the time and place of battle, and the choice of weapons. Yemen is now the “new frontline” in the global war between Al Queda and the United States with Saudi Arabia’s security hanging in the balance.

Al Queda's New Yemen Strategy Threatens U.S.-Saudi Arabia Axis

Webster Brooks